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Abstract
Background
Concerns about the high cost of orphan drugs has led to questions being asked about the
generosity of the incentives for development, and associated company profits.
Methods
We conducted a retrospective, propensity score matched study of publicly-listed orphan
companies. Cases were defined as holders of orphan drug market authorisation in Europe
or the USA between 2000–12. Control companies were selected based on their propensity
for being orphan drug market authorisation holders. We applied system General Method of
Moments to test whether companies with orphan drug market authorization are valued
higher, as measured by the Tobin’s Q and market to book value ratios, and are more profit-
able based on return on assets, than non-orphan drug companies.
Results
86 companies with orphan drug approvals in European (4), USA (61) or both (21) markets
were matched with 258 controls. Following adjustment, orphan drug market authorization
holders have a 9.6% (95% confidence interval, 0.6% to 18.7%) higher return on assets than
non-orphan drug companies; Tobin’s Q was higher by 9.9% (1.0% to 19.7%); market to book
value by 15.7% (3.1% to 30.0%) and operating profit by 516% (CI 19.8% to 1011%). For
each additional orphan drug sold, return on assets increased by 11.1% (0.6% to 21.3%),
Tobin’s Q by 2.7% (0.2% to 5.2%), and market to book value ratio by 5.8% (0.7% to 10.9%).
Conclusions
Publicly listed pharmaceutical companies that are orphan drug market authorization hold-
ers are associated with higher market value and greater profits than companies not produc-
ing treatments for rare diseases.
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Introduction
The Orphan medicinal products regulation of the European Parliament and the United States
Orphan Drug Act aim to incentivise pharmaceutical companies to develop medicines for rare
diseases that would otherwise not be commercially viable [1]. A measure of the success of these
regulations is the number of orphan drugs approved. The European Commission has desig-
nated 1,586 products as orphan, and authorized 123 since legislation was introduced in 2000.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA has approved 503 drugs and biologic
products for rare diseases since the 1983 Orphan Drug Act, compared with fewer than 10 such
products in the decade prior to the Act [2]. Orphan drugs accounted for nearly half (21 of 45)
of all new innovative drugs approved by the FDA in 2015 [3].
To qualify for orphan designation in the European Union, a medicinemust be indicated for
a life-threatening or chronically debilitating disease with either a prevalence of less than 5 in
10,000 or otherwisedeemed to be not profitable to develop. There must be no satisfactory alter-
native treatment, or the medicinemust be of significant benefit to those affected by the condi-
tion. The FDA Office of Orphan Products Development may designate a drug as an orphan if
indicated for a condition with a prevalence of<200,000 people in the USA.
The small markets associated with rare diseases, however, necessitate high prices for returns
to bemade on investments, and orphan drugs are generallymore expensive than non-orphan
drugs [4]. Each one of the world’s 10 most expensive drugs is an orphan, with alipogene tiparvo-
vec (gene therapy approved in Europe for inherited lipoprotein lipase deficiency) ranked highest
at about US$1.4m per patient over a year [5]. The revenue-generating potential of orphan drugs
is consequently as great as for non-orphan drugs [6] with almost a third beingUS$1bn block-
buster products in terms of global annual sales [7]. The orphan drugsmarket is expected to reach
US$176bn by 2020, and account for 19% of total branded prescription drug sales [4].
Orphan drugs also command a higher profit margin, owing to shorter clinical development
time, incentives related to research and development, reducedmarketing costs and premium
pricing [6,8]. However, it is unclear whether this necessarily translates to higher company profits
[9,10]. One cross-sectional analysis of a small sample of specialisedorphan drug companies con-
cluded that they had not performed as strongly as other companies [11]. This observation is not
supported by the evidence of the rapid and extensive diversification into the orphan drugsmarket
by large pharmaceutical companies, some of which have established dedicated rare disease units,
and acquired or partnered biotech companies already in the rare disease sector [12].
Concerns have been expressedmeanwhile that orphan drug policies are being exploited by
companies as treatments initially approved for rare diseases are later usedmore broadly [13].
Rituximab, as one example, was initially approved as an orphan drug by the FDA for the treat-
ment of follicular non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. It is now used to treat a wide variety of condi-
tions making it the fourth best-selling drug in the world in 2014.
We hypothesise that companies with orphan drugmarket authorization are more profitable
and are more attractive investment opportunities than non-orphan drug companies. We aimed
to test whether the financial performance of publicly listed European and US orphan drug
companies is better than matched non-orphan drug companies in terms of their market value
and profitability.
Methods
Source data and sample
Cases were defined as publicly-listed companies which were holders of orphan drugmarket
authorisation in or Europe or the USA in any period between 2000 (when the Orphan
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Medicinal Product Regulationwas introduced in Europe) and 2012. These were identified
from the European Medicines Agency database of authorised orphan medicines [14] and from
the US Food and Drug Administration’s database of Orphan Drug Product designation [15].
We defined potentially eligible controls as publicly-listed companies, registered in the same
countries as the cases, but which had no market authorisation for orphan medicinal products
in Europe or the USA during the sampling period. These were identified from all publicly-trad-
ing listed companies within the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industrial subsectors (Data-
stream, Thomson Reuters, NY), and cross-checked with the orphan drugs databases.
Companies were required to have complete data on the relevant financial variables.
Control companies were matched based on their propensity for being orphan drugmarket
authorisation holders, conditional on a set of variables using the psmatch2 command in Stata
version 13 (Statacorp, TX) [16]. Propensity scores were calculated using a Probit model with
robust standard errors adjusted with company clusters using the following explanatory vari-
ables (Table 1): the natural logarithm of total assets, the ratio of research and development
expenditure to total assets, and a dummy to identify a company as being in the pharmaceutical
Table 1. Definition of the variables.
Variables Description
Dependent variables
Ln Tobin’s Q ratio ln(TQ) A measure of a company’s market value, calculated as the natural logarithm
of the ratio of total assets minus book value of companies’ equity plus market
value of equity, to total assets.
Ln Market to book value
ratio ln(MB)
A measure of a company’s market value, calculated as the natural logarithm
of the ratio of market value of a company’s equity to the book (or accounting)
value of equity.
Return on Assets (ROA) A profitability ratio which gauges a company’s return on investment.
Calculated as the ratio of a company’s net income prior to financing costs
(earnings before interest and taxes) to total assets.
Operating profit (EBITDA/
REV)
An alternative profitability ratio which gauges a company’s return on
investment. Calculated as the ratio of a company’s net income prior to
financing costs (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization)
to total revenue.
Key variables
ORPHAN Dummy variable that equals one for the year in which a company holds
market authorization for an orphan drug, otherwise zero.
NORPHAN Number of orphan drugs with authorization in a given year.
DORPHAN Dummy variable that equals one if a company has held orphan drug market
authorization at any time, otherwise zero.
SORPHAN Ratio of orphan drug sales to total sales.
Financial Variables
Size Size is likely to impact on performance as a result of scale differences in
operations, market regulations, and agency problems. Calculated as the
natural logarithm of total assets, converted from local currencies to US
dollars using historic foreign exchange rates.
Leverage Debt can play a role in reducing the agency costs of free cash flows by
preventing investments in non-positive net present value projects. By
contrast, debt might also increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and credit
risks, which may prevent a company from investing in profitable investment
opportunities. Calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
R&D/TA Research and development activities result in new technologies, products or
production processes that would return gains in performance. Represented
as the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets.
Capex/PPE The ratio of annual capital expenditure to the value of existing property, plant
and equipment, represents a company’s investment intensity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164681.t001
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subsector. We selected the best matching companies, based on the largest year-averaged pro-
pensity scores by country, to achieve a 3:1 ratio of control to cases. A sample based on match-
ing by maximum propensity score in any given year by country, was assessed as an alternative
approach, as was consideration of total revenue (expressed as a ratio to total assets).
Outcomes and possible confounding factors
We assessed the performance of companies based on their Tobin’s Q ratio, market to book
value ratio and return on assets (Table 1). The primary explanatory variable of interest
(ORPHAN) is a time-variant dummy that equals one for a given year in which a company
holds orphan drugmarket authorization, otherwise zero.
Potential confounding variables included company size, leverage, ratio of research and
development expenditure to total assets, and the ratio of capital expenditure to property, plant
and equipment (Table 1).
Financial data for all companies were obtained from annual accounts for the years 2000–12
from Datastream. These were eachWinsorized at 98% to limit the influence of outliers.
Data analysis
We used a standard model of company performance based on a linear function of financial
explanatory variables (Table 1) [17–20]. Corporate performancemodels are likely to present
problems of endogeneity arising from three sources [20]: i) simultaneity of dependent and
explanatory variables e.g. performance drives size and vice versa; ii) the correlation of regres-
sors and error terms, e.g. shocks affecting corporate performance are also likely to affect other
explanatory variables such as leverage; and, iii) the likely dynamic relationship between current
explanatory variables with past performance. To overcome these problems, we applied system
GeneralMethod of Moments (GMM) using the Stata command xtabond2 to obtain the esti-
mates from the dynamic specification of the performancemodel (i.e. including the lagged
dependent variable) [21]. We specified the function for small sample adjustment, the twostep
command to correct for finite-sample bias and we used robust standard errors which are con-
sistent with panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the one-step estimation.
We treated the value model conservatively by assuming that all the financial variables were
endogenous, leaving the time dummies and ORPHAN as exogenous variables. We instru-
mented the endogenous variables by using as many lags as possible to avoid weakening the
Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. Not all the available instruments were used to
specify the regressions (i.e. from lags two, onwards) as this would weaken the Hansen test of
overriding restrictions, and the difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets
for the equations in levels. We measured the presence of autocorrelation of second order in the
disturbance term (AR2), which might indicate bias in the coefficients.The validity of the sys-
tem GMMmodels was confirmed in all regressions.
Sensitivity analyses
To test the robustness of the findings to modelling assumptions, we conducted several sensitiv-
ity analyses.
The pooledOLS estimator was used for comparison with the system GMM estimator, as
while the latter may be more appealing statistically, it is very sensitive to the specification of the
instrumental variables [22]. The OLS regressions were calculatedwith robust standard errors
clustered by company and included country and time dummies to account for economic fac-
tors that were outside the control of companies.
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The variable ORPHAN was specified in alternative ways; firstly as a discrete variable to rep-
resent the annual number of orphan drugs sold by each company (NORPHAN) to test whether
an increase in the number of orphan drugs per company is associated with better performance.
Secondly, we applied the Taylor and Hausman estimator which controls for fixed effects with-
out eliminating the time-invariant effects, by specifying the DORPHAN variable, which equals
one if the company holds market authorization for an orphan drug at any time in the sampling
period, otherwise zero. Thirdly, we tested whether increases in orphan drug sales corresponded
with increases in company performance by constructing a variable to represent orphan drug
sales as a proportion of each company’s total annual sales (SORPHAN) for the period 2004–12.
Orphan drug sales were obtained from the DrugAnalystDatabase [23], and total sales fromData-
stream for each corresponding year. As orphan drug sales were not available for all companies,
we used a different set of control companies based on propensity score matching, as before.
Results
We identified 181 companies with authorisation for orphan medicinal products in US (135),
European (20) or both (26) markets. Of these, 93 companies were excluded: 80 were not pub-
licly listed, 9 were registered in jurisdictions outside of Europe or the USA and 6 did not have
the relevant financial data available. The remaining 86 companies, with orphan drug approvals
in the US (61), European (4) or both (21) markets, were registered in 7 countries: Denmark,
France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, United States and the UK (Table 2). These companies
were market authorization holders for an average of 2 (range 1 to 13) orphan drugs and for 197
(63%) of the 313 orphan drugs authorized in total over the sampling period.Orphan drug sales
represented 38% of total sales in the 28 companies for which we had data, but this ranged from
a mean of 6% among French companies to 53% in Swiss companies. Within individual compa-
nies, orphan drug sales ranged from 0.1% to 100% of total sales.
The characteristics of case and control companies are presented in Table 3. Matching
resulted in a less biased selection of controls, as indicated by the standardised percentage bias
(which is the difference of the means between case and control samples, expressed as a percent-
age of the square root of the average of the sample variances in each group [24]). Although
matching based on the maximum propensity score achieved an agreement rate of 71.7% with
companies selected on the basis of average score, the sample was more biased and therefore not
considered suitable for further analysis (S1 Table). Inclusion of the ratio of total revenue to
Table 2. Characteristics of the data.
Country Number of non-orphan
companies (unmatched
sample)
Number of orphan
drug companies
Mean number (SD; range) of orphan
drugs per company (in any single
year)
Orphan drug sales as a proportion of
total sales, reported as mean (SD;
range)*
Denmark 14 3 2.24 (0.83; 1, 3) 0.20 (0.07; 0.017, 0.23)
France 30 4 1.75 (0.53; 1, 3) 0.06 (0.08; 0.003, 0.20)
Germany 32 3 1.79 (0.92; 1, 3) 0.18 (0.07; 0.115, 0.28)
Spain 6 1 1.83 (0.41; 1, 2) n/a
Switzerland 19 3 4.00 (1.58; 1, 8) 0.53 (0.45; 0.047, 0.98)
UK 107 5 3.24 (2.25; 1, 8) 0.20 (0.19; 0.001, 0.52)
USA 683 67 1.70 (1.30; 1, 9) 0.44 (0.38; 0.001, 1.00)
All
countries
891 86 2.02 (1.51; 1, 9) 0.38 (0.37; 0.001, 1.00)
* Data available for 28 companies; no orphan drug sales data available for the Spanish company.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164681.t002
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total assets in calculating propensity score resulted in a selection of controls that only differed
by one company (agreement rate of 99.6%).
On average, orphan companies are larger in size and have a higher ratio of R&D expendi-
ture to total assets than matched controls. A lower proportion of orphan companies are from
the pharmaceutical subsector as opposed to the biotechnology subsector. Leverage and Capex/
PPE were comparable between orphan and non-orphan companies. Orphan drug companies
have comparable unadjusted TQs (3.73 vs 5.08) and MB (4.94 vs 4.37) to matched controls, but
higher ROA (-0.15 vs -0.37) and EBITDA/REV (-7.65 vs -22.92) (Table 3).
Following adjustment for confounders, ORPHAN is positively significant in determining
company performance (Table 4). Compared with non-orphan companies, the Tobin’s Q ratio
of companies holding market authorisation for orphan drugs is higher by 9.9% (95% confi-
dence interval, 1.0% to 19.7%); the market to book value ratio is higher by 15.7% (95% CI, 3.1%
to 30.0%); ROA is higher by 9.6% (95% CI, 0.6% to 18.7%); and operating profit higher by
515.5% (CI, 19.8% to 1011%) (S2 Table).
Capex/PPE is associated with increases in profitability, but neither Capex/PPE nor company
size are significantly associated with market value. R&D/TA is positive and significant in deter-
mining the value of companies (i.e. ln(TQ) and ln(MB)), but not significant in determining
ROA. An increase in leverage is associated with higher company value, but lower profitability.
Sensitivity analyses
Use of pooledOLS supported the findings of system GMMwith respect to the coefficient on
the ORPHAN variable. However, some differences were apparent for other variables. OLS
revealed significant associations between R&D/TA and ln(MB) and betweenCapex/PPE and
market value (S3 Table). Associations between leverage and ln(MB) and betweenCapex/PPE
and ROA were no longer significant in the pooledOLS.
We found a positive and significant relationship between the number of orphan drugs being
sold (NORPHAN) and company performance (Table 5; Fig 1). This finding was consistent
using both regression methods (S4 Table). Based on system GMM, for each additional orphan
Table 3. Mean values of financial variables for orphan and non-orphan drug companies.
Orphan companies Unmatched sample of non-orphan
companies
Non-orphan companies matched by
average propensity score
Variables Mean Mean P value Bias (%) Mean P value Bias (%)
Performance measures
TQ 3.73 11.33 <0.001 5.08 0.204
MB 4.94 3.43 0.090 4.37 0.363
ROA -0.15 -1.14 <0.001 -0.37 0.011
EDITDA/REV -7.65 -22.92 <0.001 -11.04 0.221
Explanatory variables
Size 12.02 10.19 <0.001 63.6 11.45 <0.001 20.3
Leverage 0.32 0.55 0.003 -14.5 0.31 0.772 1.3
R&D/TA 0.20 0.39 <0.001 -37.4 0.16 0.007 11.0
Capex/PPE 0.33 0.34 0.389 -3.6 0.31 0.324 4.4
Pharmaceutical sub-sector 0.57 0.44 <0.001 26.3 0.70 <0.001 -26.0
Mean bias (%) 29.1 12.6
Median bias (%) 26.3 11.0
P values indicate the significance of the difference in means between controls and the sample of orphan drug companies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164681.t003
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drug sold, TQ increased by 2.7% (95% CI, 0.2% to 5.2%), MB by 5.8% (95% CI, 0.7% to 10.9%)
and ROA by 11.1% (95% CI, 0.6% to 21.3%). As with the primary analysis, orphan drug com-
panies perform consistently and significantly better than non-orphan companies using DOR-
PHAN as the key variable of interest (Table 5). Based on SORPHAN, we observed that for each
additional 10% increase in orphan drug sales (as a proportion of total sales), TQ increased by
4.6% (95% CI, 1.2% to 7.9%), MB by 3.8% (95% CI, -0.4% to 7.9%) and ROA by 1.6 units (95%
CI, 0.3 to 2.9) (Table 5).
Discussion
Pharmaceutical companies with orphan drugs among their portfolio of products are more
profitable and command a higher market value than companies not engaged in orphan drug
development. Our analysis of publicly listed European and US companies which are orphan
drugmarket authorisation holders, reveals that their market value (based on the Tobin’s Q
ratio) and profitability is about 10% higher than matched non-orphan companies. These find-
ings are robust to assumptions relating to the method of analysis and alternative specification
of the variable representing orphan drug status.
Our findings contradict previous reports [11,25] which suggested that orphan drug compa-
nies are less profitable and less valuable than other pharmaceutical companies, and which the
authors explain to be because of higher R&D expenses that decrease their net profit margin.
Morel et al’s (2014) [11] analysis is based on comparisons of financial ratios among cohorts of
only 6–7 companies, but is prone to bias for not controlling for the size of orphan drug compa-
nies, and is compromised by having control companies being themselves producers of orphan
drugs.
Table 4. The impact of orphan drug company status on company performance.
ln(TQ) ln(MB) ROA
Variables Estimator P value Estimator P value Estimator P value
ORPHAN 0.094 0.026 0.146 0.013 0.118 0.038
Size -0.008 0.479 0.018 0.297 0.076 0.148
Leverage 0.149 <0.001 1.069 0.001 -0.545 0.045
R&D/TA 0.246 0.024 0.380 0.062 -0.339 0.512
Capex/PPE 0.076 0.283 0.077 0.525 0.516 0.040
Dependentt-1 0.504 <0.001 0.535 <0.001 0.259 0.052
Constant 0.390 0.006 0.398 0.056 -1.227 0.144
Number of observations 2,390 2,141 2,411
Number of cases: controls 84: 244 83: 229 83: 250
Number of instruments 293 293 263
AR(2) test 0.467 0.970 0.748
Hansen test 0.293 0.433 0.090
Difference-in-Hansen test 0.887 0.765 0.959
All regressions include time dummies. Instruments are set from t-2 to t-6 in the ln(TQ) and ln(MB) models and from t-3 to t-7 in the ROA model.
The number of companies included in the analyses was lower than the original sample of 86 cases and 258 controls. This was for two reasons: (i) system
GMM requires at least two years of data, which were not available for some companies; and (ii) ln(MB) was undefined for companies reporting negative
equity.
The AR(2) test reports the P value of a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The
Hansen test reports the P value of the test of over-identification under the null that all instruments are valid. The difference-in-Hansen test reports the P
value of the null hypothesis that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164681.t004
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The strengths of our analysis included the use of a standard performancemodel which
allowed the inference of consistent and unbiased parameters based on the whole set of observa-
tions of publicly listed companies. To eliminate selection bias that could arise from financial
performance, we included active, dead and suspended companies over the period of interest.
The econometric analysis was robust to account for the endogeneity problem common to cor-
porate financemodels.
However, we recognise limitations relating to data in that some companies were omitted
because of a lack of available financial information, and orphan drug sales data were available
for less than a third of cases.We further limited our sample to publicly listed European and US
companies. Orphan drugs legislations in other jurisdictions also make provisions for a range of
incentives for development, and many developers of orphan drugs are private companies for
which no financial data are available.
The higher value and profitability of orphan drug companies can be plausibly explained by
several factors. Firstly are the incentives on offer to develop orphan drugs, of which market
exclusivity is most important. This is for 10 years in Europe (plus an extra 2 years if paediatric
development included) and 7 years (plus 6 months with paediatric indications) for each orphan
Table 5. Sensitivity analyses using the number of orphans drugs sold per year (NORPHAN), a non-variant orphan dummy (DORPHAN), and the
proportion of orphan drug sales to total sales (SORPHAN).
NORPHAN DORPHAN SORPHAN
Variables ln(TQ) ln(MB) ROA ln(TQ) ln(MB) ROA ln(TQ) ln(MB) ROA
_ORPHAN 0.027
(0.036)
0.058
(0.026)
0.041
(0.037)
0.226 (0.011) 0.480 (0.002) 0.327 (0.027) 0.459
(0.008)
0.375
(0.075)
0.159
(0.018)
Size -0.014
(0.227)
-0.002
(0.195)
0.070
(0.174)
-0.015
(0.004)
-0.021
(0.007)
-0.025
(0.044)
0.029
(0.503)
0.002
(0.718)
0.067
(0.038)
Leverage 0.139
(<0.001)
0.491
(0.196)
-0.562
(0.040)
0.175
(<0.001)
0.991
(<0.001)
-0.886
(<0.001)
0.158
(0.331)
-0.016
(0.984)
-0.123
(0.474)
R&D/TA 0.219
(0.158)
0.535
(0.080)
-0.294
(0.567)
0.383
(<0.001)
0.721
(<0.001)
-0.451
(<0.001)
1.061
(0.244)
-0.370
(0.606)
-0.954
(0.014)
Capex/PPE -0.025
(0.820)
-0.141
(0.384)
0.530
(0.033)
0.188
(<0.001)
0.135 (0.016) -0.148
(0.072)
-0.096
(0.798)
0.460
(0.537)
0.038
(0.826)
Dependentt-1 0.634
(<0.001)
0.615
(<0.001)
0.262
(0.041)
0.480
(<0.001)
0.582
(<0.001)
-0.005
(0.980)
Constant 0.427
(0.016)
0.486
(0.042)
-1.152
(0.158)
0.839
(<0.001)
0.868
(<0.001)
0.212 (0.198) -0.234
(0.724)
0.120
(0.880)
-0.812
(0.084)
Observations 2,390 2,141 2,411 2,677 2,448 2,704 512 480 524
Number of cases:
controls
84: 244 83: 229 83: 250 86: 258 84: 248 86: 258 27: 69 25: 63 27: 70
AR(2) test (0.659) 0.893 (0.732) (0.874) (0.364) (0.317)
Hansen test (0.197) (0.371) (0.212) (0.465) (0.282) (0.442)
Difference-in-Hansen (0.535) (0.212) (0.904) (0.426) (0.147) (0.917)
Number of
instruments
263 263 288 49 49 94
Wald χ2 test 298.74
(<0.001)
113.26
(<0.001)
767.19
(<0.001)
Values are estimators (unless specified otherwise) with P values in parentheses. All regressions include time dummies. _ORPHAN denotes NORPHAN,
SORPHAN or DORPHAN for each dummy variable.
Refer to footnote of Table 4 for interpretation of the system GMM model validity tests (with NORPHAN and SORPHAN). The Taylor and Hausman model
was applied for DORPHAN.
Instruments are set in NORPHAN from lags 3 to 7 for the ln(TQ) and ln(MB) models, and from lags 3 to 8 for the ROA model; and, in SORPHAN from lags 2
onwards (using the Stata collapse command) for the ln(TQ) and ln(MB) models; and from lags 3 to 4 for the ROA model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164681.t005
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designation in the USA. Incentives also include protocol assistance, reduced or waived regula-
tory fees and, in the USA, tax credits equal to 50% of clinical investigation expenses, and clini-
cal trial subsidies [26].
Secondly, the cost of orphan drug research and development is lower than for non-orphan
drugs. Phase III clinical trials of orphan drugs, for instance, are less expensive than non-orphan
drug trials, at an average of US$95m versus US$219m per product approved [4]. Many orphan
drugs (38%) are repurposed from other indications [27], which reduces uncertainty concerning
their safety, accelerates time to market authorisation [6,28], and increases regulatory success
rates [29,30]. Following authorization, the cost of marketing is comparatively small because the
target populations of physicians and patients are themselves so small. This contrasts with mar-
keting costs for medicines generally, which exceed R&D costs [31].
Thirdly, there are legitimate concerns about the use of orphan drugs for unapproved non-
orphan indications [32]. This practice increases companies’ revenues, and may be seen as
exploiting the incentives and the spirit of the Orphan Drug Act.
Fourthly is the pricing of orphan drugs. The mean price of the top 100 orphan drugs by
sales in 2014 was more than 6 times higher, at $137,782 per patient per year, than of a compa-
rable sample of non-orphans ($20,875) [4]. Despite the smaller rare diseasemarket, the reve-
nue generating potential of orphans is similar to non-orphan drugs [6]. Neither public nor
private health plans have much leverage in negotiating the prices for orphan drugs. In the
Fig 1. Relation between the number of orphan drugs marketed and the performance of companies. Calculated from predictions of the fitted
pooled OLS regression, with NORPHAN as the explanatory variable of interest, and with all other covariates fixed to average values. Data are
presented as the means and 95% confidence bounds (S4 Table).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164681.g001
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USA, nearly all orphan drugs are covered by private health insurance and social insurance pro-
grams such as Medicare, which provides cover for many adults with debilitating rare condi-
tions [33]. Across Europe, orphan drugs often bypass health technology appraisal, or at least
are subject to more lenient processes [34].
In conclusion, our analysis shows that policies directed towards incentivising orphan drug
development have worked to the extent that companies are profiting excessively. This may
have the adverse unintended consequence of directing R&D resources away from other areas
of unmet clinical need, a situation which will likely be exacerbated as common diseases are
increasingly reconsidered as multiple rare conditions, each eligible for orphan designation.
We recommend that EU and US orphan drug legislations should make provisions for incen-
tives to be proportionate to the monetary success associated with marketing orphan drugs.
Continuation of the status quo will make orphan drugs less affordable and companies more
profitable.
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